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BEYOND THE CONSTITUTION. By Hadley Arkes. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 1990. Pp. ix, 278. $24.95. 
In his 1986 book First Things: An Inquiry into the First Principles 
of Morals and Justice, 1 Professor Hadley Arkes2 sought a return to 
what he termed the "original understanding of the foundations of law 
and polity."3 For Arkes, this understanding encompassed a notion of 
moral principles not as fortuitous developments of cultural systems, 
and not as particular devices for the maintenance of a smoothly func-
tioning societal machinery, to be retooled or discarded when they 
cease to serve their purpose, but rather as universal, eternal, necessary, 
and discoverable truths. Professor Arkes confronted the "widely trav-
eled fallacy"4 of moral relativism and decried the abandonment of an 
objective ethic that, Arkes maintained, had been fully within the most 
basic understanding of philosophers and statesmen from the ancients 
to the American Founders. 
Bringing to bear an arsenal of Arkes' "first principles," First 
Things took aim at a host of modem ethical dilemmas, from abortion5 
to wealth redistribution, 6 from the welfare state7 to the nation's partic-
ipation in the Vietnam conflict. 8 With wit, logic, and perhaps an air of 
omniscience, Arkes made a case for the existence of moral principles 
carrying the force and inescapability of natural laws. But if the reader 
of First Things was convinced, by wave after wave of Arkes' carefully 
selected conundra and dogmatic syllogisms, of the existence of an ob-
jective morality, it was conviction without comfort. Arkes seemed so 
concerned with rejecting moral relativism that he ignored the difficulty 
in identifying the universal ethics that were to take its place. 
Now, in his new book, Beyond the Constitution, Professor Arkes 
has turned his attentions and his ethics toward a different front: con-
stitutional law. In First Things, Arkes disparaged what he perceived 
as a juristic trend, since the purer days of John Marshall and Joseph 
Story, away from a recognition of the moral principles that underlie 
the Constitution and toward the modem confusion stemming from a 
misguided textualism. In Beyond the Constitution, Arkes makes a 
1. H. ARKES, FIRST THINGS: AN INQUIRY INTO THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND 
JUSTICE (1986). 
2. Hadley Arkes is Edward Ney Professor of Jurisprudence and American Institutions at 
Amherst College. 
3. H. ARKES, supra note 1, at 8. 
4. Id. at 6. 
5. Id. at 360422. 
6. Id. at 309-26. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. at 232-87. 
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closer study of the relationship between the Constitution and the basic 
moral understandings that, he claims, its text merely reflects. 
While the antagonist of First Things was moral relativism, in his 
latest book Arkes takes on its jural incarnation, legal positivism. 
Arkes decries the "modem heresy" (p. 14)- taught, he assures us, in 
all the law schools (p. 15) - that the basic principles behind the 
American polity came into being only with the promulgation of the 
Constitution in 1787. Lawyers and ordinary citizens alike, Arkes 
complains, "have come to speak the language of 'legal positivism' " (p. 
81), claiming various rights only "under" or "through" the constitu-
tional text. In fact, asserts Arkes, the Constitution is merely "a 
means, an instrument for conveying, in legal structure, the principles 
that marked the character of the American republic" (p. 40). And, 
says Arkes, the principles around which the Constitution was framed 
were part of a natural law understanding in existence long before the 
creation of the Constitution itself. 
According to Arkes, the modem positivism has led to an almost 
idolatrous preoccupation with the constitutional text. Because the 
text is seen as the source of political rights and obligations, says Arkes, 
that text has become all-important, and the moral truths behind it 
have become obscured. The jurisprudence of the Constitution has be-
come one of "slogans rather than principles," characterized by "con-
venient formulas produced by lawyers" and lacking a discourse for 
applying the first principles upon which the document is based (pp. 18-
19). From this phenomenon, Arkes complains, has arisen a need to 
resort to tricky formulas and wordplay in applying the text to contem-
porary social dilemmas. The Framers, according to Arkes, intended 
only that the text provide general guidelines for applying, in each new 
case, what Arkes calls the "reasoning spirit" of the Constitution - a 
spirit animated not by the necessarily limited scope of the language, 
but by the universal principles that the text can only partially reflect 
(pp. 21-39). 
Indeed, it hardly requires acknowledgement that, as Arkes sug-
gests, the stiff eighteenth-century phrases of the constitutional text 
rarely apply with any clarity to dynamic twentieth-century problems.9 
How, then, would Arkes bring the constitutional text to bear on mod-
em issues? Importantly, Arkes seeks neither to rediscover original in-
tent by way of a "quaint project in 'historical' reconstruction" (p. 17), 
nor to fill in gaps in the text by appealing to dominant cultural notions 
of social justice. This is not to say that the "original intent" of the 
framers has no relevance for Arkes. Rather, for him the Framers' "in-
tent" is relevant only as a means of understanding the moral laws that 
9. Pp. 21-23. See generally L. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS' CONSTITU-
TION 350-55 (1988); Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEXAS L. REV. 693, 694 
(1976). 
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the framers themselves understood; it carries no inherent normative 
weight merely by virtue of its status as original intent. 
This view sets Arkes apart from many modern conservative schol-
ars. Both Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Robert Bork, for in-
stance, ultimately embrace original intent not because of the insights it 
might provide into natural law, as Arkes does, but because it repre-
sents the first and best word on that positive law which is the Constitu-
tion.10 At the same time, Arkes' refusal to accept prevailing social 
values as instrumental in interpreting the Constitution separates him 
not only from "liberal commentators on the law [who] have been quite 
willing to advance a 'living Constitution' " guided by contemporary 
mores (p. 11 ), but also from such critics of positivism as Ronald 
Dworkin, who would draw constitutional principles from the "na-
tion's political traditions and culture."11 Arkes, for whom the Consti-
tution is a reflection of universal, natural law, finds the "habits of the 
tribe" (p. 13) of little value in divining constitutional meaning, 
whether those habits are traditional or modern in origin. 
The Bill of Rights provides the starting point for Arkes' assault on 
constitutional positivism. Modern jurisprudence, Arkes laments, has 
confirmed the Federalists' fear that the Bill of Rights "would narrow 
our understanding of the rights that government was meant to pro-
tect" and "misinstruct the American people about the ground of their 
rights" (pp. 59-60). Contemporary treatment of the first ten amend-
ments epitomizes for Arkes the dangers of venerating the text (pp. 58-
80). 
Most notable in Arkes' chapter on the Bill of Rights is his conten-
tion that these amendments, laying out as they do general rules for the 
interplay between personal rights and government interests, fail to 
provide adequate grounds for deciding specific ethical dilemmas. 
Arkes is correct in recognizing that even given broadly written rules 
like those in the Bill of Rights, many difficult cases can be decided 
satisfactorily only by applying a justification analysis that is narrow, 
fact-specific, and independent of the rules themselves - in essence, by 
asking whether, given the specific facts of the case, the government is 
justified in restraining an individual's liberty. In these cases, as Arkes 
asserts, "the Bill of Rights would make no difference in guiding our 
judgment" (p. 69), because even without a Bill of Rights the question 
must resolve itself to a weighing of individual interests against govern-
10. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 777-86 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Bork, 
Judicial Review and Democracy, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1061 
(L. Levy, K. Karst & D. Mahoney eds. 1986); Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amend-
ment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 14, 20-22 (1971) [hereinafter Bork, Neutral Principles]; Rehn-
quist, supra note 9. For an interesting commentary on Justice Rehnquist's notions of original 
intent, see Jaffa, What Were the "Original Intentions" of the Framers of the Constitution of the 
United States?, 10 u. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 351, 423-48 (1987) .. 
11. R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 378 (1986). 
1398 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 89:1395 
ment ones.12 But Arkes' critique of the Bill of Rights extends beyond 
these difficult cases: by narrowly labeling each issue as a "free speech" 
problem or a "due process" problem, he insists, the Bill of Rights ob-
structs our view of the underlying, independent principles of justifica-
tion that should always be applied (pp. 58-80). As such, it does more 
harm than good. 
In following this road, however, Arkes in essence rejects a rule-
based regime in favor of a system of ad hoc adjudication - a system in 
which each case is decided based on a careful weighing of its own 
particular factors, sui generis, without regard to bright-line rules. One 
might seriously question whether such a system is practicable. Indeed, 
an important function of the Bill of Rights may well be to provide 
bright-line rules that obviate the need for fact-specific adjudication by 
clearly instructing government as to how it may, and may not, act.13 
Complete fairness is sacrificed for efficiency, adaptability for 
consistency. 
Arkes also fails to recognize that even where written rules fail to 
dispose of a particularly difficult question and adjudication results, the 
rules serve another important function: they flag the principles that 
must be considered as fact-based adjudication proceeds. In constitu-
tional jurisprudence, when a protected right is at issue in a case, a 
process is triggered which requires the balancing of the individual's 
right against the interest of the state in restricting it. This process has 
become automatic in our courts.14 But without this shorthand mecha-
12. Arkes takes as an example the case Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986), involv-
ing an Orthodox Jewish psychologist in the Air Force who refused, contrary to regulations, to 
remove his yarmulke while indoors. As Arkes perceives it, "[w]hether Goldman had a 'right' to 
wear his yarmulke in the military would depend on whether there was a compelling, or even 
plausible, interest on the part of the government in preserving uniforms and avoiding the use of 
sectarian symbols." P. 69. A hypothetical amendment in the Bill of Rights preserving the "right 
to wear a hat" would add nothing to the consideration of this problem, Arkes contends, because 
"[w]e would still find ourselves weighing the question of whether the army could have a justifica-
tion for imposing restrictions on certain kinds of headgear." P. 69. The addition of a specific 
"right to wear a hat" would not eliminate the task of analyzing whether, in this particular case, 
the government's interests were strong enough to justify restricting Goldman's personal freedom. 
13. Ideally, a written Constitution would avoid litigation by enumerating easily understood 
rules for government to follow. Litigation would be avoided because neither government nor 
citizens would be confused about what the rules mean; there would be no need for courts to 
interpret the rules, and there would be little incentive for government to break the rules, knowing 
that any violation would be readily apparent and easily determined by the courts. In the real 
world, of course, rules cannot be perfectly expressed, nor can they be created to anticipate every 
possible situation; certainly, they can never achieve both ideals. In fact, common sense suggests 
an inverse relationship between the specificity of a rule and its adaptability. Thus there is a 
considerable gray area in which government action must be reviewed by the courts on a case-by-
case basis. But Arkes' approach, taken to its logical conclusion, would seem to imply such a fact· 
specific adjudication in nearly every case (since facts will always differ slightly from case to case). 
14. Consider, for example, the chain of "clear and present danger'' cases involving first 
amendment rights, where the individual's right of free expression has been balanced against the 
threat to society that such expression has posed: Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); 
Dennis v. United States, 341U.S.494 (1951); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 
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nism, in the form of the Bill of Rights, for signaling the need for justifi-
cation analysis, one of two things is likely to happen: either rights 
must wither away outside the glare of constitutionally mandated judi-
cial scrutiny, or the courts must of their own accord establish the 
existence of rights - a process beyond the reach of the electorate, 
subject only to the discipline of judicial precedent, and lacking the 
indelible permanence of an authoritative text.1s 
Arkes' mistrust of the Bill of Rights notwithstanding, he would not 
dispose of the written Constitution entirely. To Arkes, the Constitu-
tion stands as an estimable attempt at the mechanics of a representa-
tive government; federalism, separation of powers, checks and 
balances, and the like were innovations of considerable genius 
designed to aid public servants, already versed in the logic of morals, 
in their application of that logic to everyday governance. But these 
concepts, in Arkes' eyes, are not themselves dictated by the logic of 
democracy; they are merely prudential measures, "a frame of govern-
ment, a legal structure" for the smoother functioning of the polity (p. 
246). In this sense, the Constitution to Arkes is simply that which 
works best. 16 
Understanding this view of the Constitution as essentially a docu-
249 U.S. 204 (1919); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); see also Masses Publishing 
Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917). 
15. Such judicially established rights, of course, exist even with the Bill of Rights, a salient 
example being the "right to privacy" firmly set down in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 
(1965), and alluded to or expanded upon in, inter alia, Carey v. Population Servs. Intl., 431 U.S. 
678 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); and 
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). But it is worth asking whether the Court in Griswold would 
have discovered such a privacy "right" without the Bill of Rights from which to work. And 
unlike the textual rights of free speech, free exercise of religion, and the like, this privacy right 
exists much more at the whim of, and control of, the oft-changing personnel who make up our 
Supreme Court. 
16. Graham Walker, in a recent work, writes that to Arkes the Constitution is "a window-
pane, letting in on public life as much of the pure light of moral principle as prudence determines 
feasible." G. WALKER, MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF CoNSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT 62 n.127 
(1990). To Arkes, Walker continues, the goal of constitutional interpretation is "to arrive at the 
point where the glass is no longer even noticed because of the brilliance of the sunlight." Id. But 
for Walker, the difficulty with this view is that it 
seems to evacuate the very notion of a constitution; it reduces a constitution to a fiction of 
prudence. If, in the final analysis, this is what constitutions are, why then bother with them 
at all? Why not just set about making sure that those who hold the levers of power are 
virtuous and prudent? 
Id. at 62-63 n.127. Walker's answer is that even moral realists like Arkes implicitly recognize 
that human beings cannot be trusted to be virtuous and prudent; that is, they doubt that leaders, 
unguided by a constitutional text, are capable of always (or even often) making the right moral 
decisions. See id. at 18-22, 60-61, 62-63 n.127, 149-52. One aspect of this argument is simply the 
recognition that, as I contend below, no adequate means exist of identifying ultimate moral 
truths or of reaching a consensus about what is virtuous (or, for that matter, prudent). Arkes 
fails to acknowledge this difficulty. See infra text accompanying notes 25-29. Another facet of 
the argument is the equally valid point that even given a hypothetical moral consensus, there is 
every possibility that leaders will choose not to act in accordance with it. This possibility, of 
course, would only be increased in the absence of written normative guidelines promulgated in a 
constitution. Arkes seems to recognize the usefulness of the Constitution in this sense when he 
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ment of utility is the key to understanding Arkes' approach to consti-
tutional jurisprudence. If the Constitution is only a means of applying 
deeper principles of morality and justice, Arkes asserts, then certainly 
it cannot hinder the application of those principles (pp. 40-57, 112-49). 
Thus, in a case where application of such a principle is clearly in or-
der, the absence of specific textual language should not prevent the 
principle from applying. And it is equally incongruous to apply the 
principle only through creative cajoling of the existing language to 
produce a textual mandate. For Arkes, the simple and logical step is 
to apply the principle directly, not under some forced logic tied to a 
specific clause but through the straightforward logic of all the clauses 
- of the very structure of a free and just society. 
From this premise springs Arkes' complaint that the constitutional 
clauses have become "whole subsets or sections of our jurisprudence" 
(p. 82) - self-contained and self-perpetuating bodies of law that trig-
ger "entirely separate logics and [give] rise to distinct lines of juridical 
construction" (p. 82). The effect, says Arkes, has been needless confu-
sion in Supreme Court constitutional analysis. In this vein, Arkes 
chides the Court for splitting into factions based upon which clause is 
proper where the majority would, in fact, reach an identical result. 17 
For Arkes, this kind of battle of the clauses is both unnecessary 
and counterproductive. It is unnecessary because a case like Edwards 
v. California, 18 involving a state's restriction of emigration into its ter-
ritory, can be decided with equal force using either the commerce 
clause or the privileges and immunities clause.19 And it is counter-
refers to the document as a "special framework[] or regime[] with distinctive rules" (p. 92) 
which "supports a regime of freedom rather than a despotism" (p. 12). 
Graham Walker's book also is notable in that, like Beyond the Constitution, it devotes consid-
erable space to a critique of modem constitutional theorists who deny the applicability of norma-
tive morality to constitutional interpretation. See G. WALKER, supra, at 9-22 (surveying 
contemporary constitutional theory and its treatment of the role of moral norms). 
17. He illustrates this problem using, inter alia, the case Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 
(1941); see infra note 18. 
18. 314 U.S. 160 (1941). The case involved a California resident, Edwards, who had brought 
his brother-in-law, an indigent Texan, to California in violation of a Depression-era state law 
prohibiting the import of indigent persons. Edwards' conviction under the law was unanimously 
overturned on appeal to the Supreme Court, but the justices followed different lines of reasoning. 
The majority opinion applied the logic of the commerce clause, holding that the California law 
imposed an unjustifiable burden on interstate commerce, 314 U.S. at 170-77, while Justices 
Douglas and Jackson each wrote concurrences rejecting the commerce clause as a suitable mode 
of analysis and applying the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment. 314 
U.S. at 177-81 (Douglas, J., concurring), 181-86 (Jackson, J., concurring). Using the commerce 
clause to overturn a state law restrictive of personal movement, both concurring justices argued, 
inappropriately trivialized such restrictions by placing them in the category of regulations gov-
erning "the movement of cattle, fruit, steel and coal." 314 U.S. at 177 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
The right of interstate travel was more basic, inherent in the notion of national citizenship. 
19. Underlying each clause, asserts Arkes, is the recognition of "the logic of a 'nation' " - a 
logic that implies "a territory in which people [are] free to move without encountering barriers 
cast up without warrant by the separate states." P. 89. Thus, as Arkes would have it, the 
"framework of the American Constitution," and not just a single specific clause, "creates a pre-
sumptive 'right' on the part of persons-to travel freely within the territory of the United States," a 
---
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productive because analysis of cases within the strict boundaries of 
specific constitutional clauses obscures the need to refer to underlying 
laws of ethics. For Arkes, a right that arises from the logic of the 
Constitution, like the right to travel freely among the states, can in the 
end only be restricted "for reasons that are compelling and justified" 
(p. 92). And this kind of analysis, Arkes asserts, requires application 
of principles that are extraconstitutional - the "canons of justifica-
tion," or "the standards that we use more generally when we try to 
distinguish between the justified or unjustified reasons for restricting 
personal freedom" (p. 93). The ground rules created by the Constitu-
tion - such as free movement among the states - imply to Arkes the 
application of extraconstitutional, natural law principles to judge dis-
putes arising from those rules. 
In this discussion of the clauses (pp. 81-111 ), Arkes again reveals 
his preference for case-by-case adjudication over a rule-based system, 
and his argument here is subject to the same critique as his treatment 
of the Bill of Rights.20 However, here Arkes mistrusts the jurispru-
0 dence surrounding the clauses more than he mistrusts the text itself, 
and his barbs have some sting. As Arkes suggests, the Supreme 
Court's treatment of the clauses over the years has reduced analysis of 
many kinds of constitutional problems to little more than a "jural shell 
game" (p. 102). One aspect of this has been a judicial dishonesty 
about the supposed immutability and singularity of the clauses. Arkes 
quite rightly points out that while in some cases, such as Edwards v. 
California, the justices spar over which clause may properly be applied 
as if each clause is "freighted with a special juridical significance" (p. 
102), in other cases the Court does not hesitate to treat the clauses 
interchangeably where the most obvious choice (say, the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment) is textually inapposite.21 
Arkes also asserts that judges, while paying lip service to the 
clauses as self-contained, unique sets of principles, have in fact not 
hesitated to decide cases, almost subconsciously, according to ex-
traconstitutional principles of justification (p. 110). This point, too, is 
well taken. In a sense, as Arkes writes, our judges "have acted in the 
right that "arises distinctly from the character of the American polity." P. 92. Because the right 
stems from the logic of the Constitution itself, quibbling over which clause to apply is a superflu-
ous exercise in hair-splitting. 
20. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text. 
21. P. 102. A telling example, mentioned by Arkes (pp. 100-03), is Frontiero v. Richardson, 
411 U.S. 677 (1973), in which a U.S. Air Force regulation discriminating against servicewomen 
who sought to claim their husbands as dependents was struck down as violative of due process. 
During the previous term, the Court, in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), had struck down 
similar discriminatory legislation by the state ofldaho on the basis of the equal protection clause. 
The Frontiero Court, however, could not use the equal protection clause because the fourteenth 
amendment does not expressly apply to the federal government. But the Court was not shy 
about transposing wholesale much of the Reed equal protection logic to the due process context 
- right down to a sentence, quoted from Reed, in which the words "Equal Protection Clause" 
were replaced with the word "Constitution" in brackets. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 690. 
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style of men who have rediscovered natural law, and yet they them-
selves can speak only the language of legal positivism" (p. 110). 
Again, a potent example is the Edwards case, where despite the disa-
greement over which constitutional clause to apply - an issue the 
justices themselves saw as crucial - each separate opinion seemed fi-
nally to tum on the extraconstitutional, moral notion that indigence in 
itself is not a just reason for restricting personal autonomy rights.22 
This core understanding of Beyond the Constitution - that the 
constitutional text should not get in the way of the extraconstitutional 
principles that must be applied in each case - also animates Arkes' 
notions of federalism,23 especially in the context of civil rights (pp. 
112-49). Here he argues that extenuated interpretations of the thir-
teenth and fourteenth amendments, or resort to the commerce clause 
to regulate Ollie's Barbecue in Birmingham, Alabama,24 are unneces-
sarily strained means of dealing with the problem of private discrimi-
nation. If society views private discrimination as a wrong, as statutes 
like the Civil Rights Acts suggest, then action by the federal govern-
ment against such discrimination need not be justified by barely credi-
ble semantic arguments. The Founders, Arkes asserts, understood 
that "the defense of [civil] rights formed the distinct mission of the 
federal government" as well as the very "rationale for the Constitu-
tion" itself (p. 124). As such, the logic of the Constitution would al-
low the national government to regulate local, private discrimination 
directly without feeling bound by any "state action" restrictions of the 
constitutional language. 
Of course, this sort of argument lends itself readily to a "slippery 
slope" critique: where does federal action find its limits, and what is 
left of the role of state and local government? Arkes seems to suggest 
that the limits are those set by a combination of tradition and pru-
dence (pp. 128-30, 141, 148-49). The Founders, he asserts, never in-
tended that the federal government take over "that full matrix of the 
common law that was present already in the laws of the states" (p. 
128) - laws on marriage, divorce, public amusements and displays, 
the preservation of the local peace, and so forth. And, says Arkes, the 
22. Edwards, 314 U.S. at 177 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("Poverty and immorality are not 
synonymous."); 314 U.S. at 181 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("[T]hose who [are] stigmatized by n 
State as indigents, paupers, or vagabonds" must not be "relegated to an inferior class of citizen· 
ship."); 314 U.S. at 184 (Jackson, J., concurring) ("'Indigence' in itself is neither a source of 
rights nor a basis for denying them."). 
23. To Arkes, federalism is at best a set of "rules of prudence or statecraft" (p. 120) designed 
to foster local enforcement of the laws wherever possible; the federalist system does not represent 
" 'apodictic' or necessary truths" (p. 120) bound up with the very notion of a constitutional 
government itself. Because of this, then, for Arkes there is no "class of wrongs, within the reach 
of the Jaw, but outside the reach of the national government." P. 111. The national government 
is competent under the Constitution to redress any wrongs, even narrowly local ones perpetrated 
by private actors; that the government does not do so should be considered merely an exercise of 
commonsense restraint rather than obeisance to the commands of any first principles. 
24. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). 
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national government would have no need to intervene in an area where 
local enforcement is quite adequate; only where some structure of the 
local government itself makes it either unwilling or unable to cope 
with injustice would federal regulation be required (pp. 129-30). 
This is not an argument that is likely to ease· the fears of diehard 
federalists. But Arkes' main point, that no wrong that deserves re-
dress is beyond the reach of the federal government, does not lose its 
force for the intimidating breadth of its implications. Indeed, if the 
primary concern regarding such plenary federal power is the potential 
for abuse, it is not clear that such potential is present to a greater 
degree when power is exercised by the federal government than when 
it is exercised at the local level. 
In its discussion of federalism here, as with its treatment of the Bill 
of Rights and the clauses, Beyond the Constitution is essentially a work 
of iconoclasm. If not quite denouncing as a false idol the constitu-
tional text, if not quite taking the torch to it, Arkes would cast away 
the intricate, gilded reliquary built up around the text by years ofliter-
alist jurisprudence. He would reemphasize the message to an audience 
woefully distracted by the medium. But if his project succeeds in al-
erting us to the existence of principles of judgment beneath, and be-
yond, the textual Constitution itself, it leaves us grasping for a firm 
hold on just what those principles are. If we cannot reach a consensus 
on the meaning of the words, how are we to agree on the principles 
that give them their force? If we cannot interpret the letter of the 
Constitution consistently, by what means are we to understand its 
spirit? 
The failure to address these questions satisfactorily is perhaps the 
greatest flaw of Arkes' book, and it reflects the obvious weakness in-
herent in any argument of moral realism. It is one thing to flag the 
existence of extralegal ethical principles; it is quite another thing to 
identify them; and it is a harder task still to propose a means for ob-
taining a consensus about them.25 Not that Arkes suggests that abso-
lute consensus is necessary, or even possible. But one detects curious 
evidence in Beyond the Constitution that Arkes fails to appreciate the 
deeper difficulties involved once a conversation takes on the language 
of absolute moral principles. In his first chapter, for instance, Arkes 
quotes a passage by Robert Bork: 
There may be a natural law, but we are not agreed upon what it is, and 
there is no such law that gives definite answers to a judge trying to de-
cide a case. 
There may be a conventional morality in our society, but on most 
issues there are likely to be several moralities. 26 
25. See, e.g., Bork, Neutral Principles. supra note 10, at 30; Bork, The Struggle Over the Role 
of the Court, 34 NATL. R.Ev. 1137 (1982); Rehnquist, supra note 9, at 704-05. 
26. P. 14 (quoting Bork, The Struggle Over the Role of the Court, supra note 25, at 1138). 
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Arkes takes this passage as an indication of the rejection, by Bork and 
other modem conservatives, of the existence of universal moral truths. 
But it seems here as if Arkes mistakes a recognition by Bork that peo-
ple disagree - and always will - over what propositions are moral 
truths, for a denial of the existence of an absolute, if elusive, moral-
ity. 27 This is an error in perception that seems to follow Arkes 
throughout Beyond the Constitution, obscuring inevitable clashes be-
tween opposing moral schemata with the blanket epithet "moral rela-
tivism." Arkes appears slow to recognize that cutting through the 
moral relativists' smokescreen does not solve the problem of whose 
"morality," in the end, must stand as the true and universal one. 
The difficulty of identifying norms becomes acute when we seek, as 
Arkes would have us do, to discover the principles that underlie the 
constitutional text. It appears that Arkes would posit, as the ultimate 
ethic animating the notion of a constitutional government, the princi-
ple that no one should be inflicted with a punishment or a burden 
without justification. Here is a view of the Constitution, and of moral-
ity, espousing personal freedopi as its highest (but not its sole) value. 
Perhaps this view is correct in an objective, universal sense. But 
the problem, readily apparent, is that its truth or falsity remain unver-
ifiable. There may be some who would propose an entirely different 
animating principle behind the Constitution - the maintenance, for 
instance, of a regime in which no person enjoys any physical or 
psychic comforts which cannot reasonably be enjoyed by all. This is 
an equality-based schema, and, as with Arkes' first principle, there is 
support for it too in the text of the Constitution. 28 And yet, often it 
may conflict quite directly with the principle that Arkes espouses: 
providing for equality of comfort may require, at times, the punish-
ment or burdening of individuals (through, perhaps, the removal of 
their property) without ''justification." Or, it may simply be said that 
the goal of equality of comfort provides the "justification" necessary 
for consistency with Arkes' principle. But this too opens a Pandora's 
box: What amounts to "justification?" Some might find it in the 
struggle for absolute equality, others in the need to promote the 
"greater good," and still others in the mission of preserving, at all 
costs, the habitat of the homed owl. 
These kinds of questions cannot be answered, as Arkes would seek 
27. Indeed, Judge Bork would appear to recognize not only the existence of immutable 
"moral harms,'' but also the validity of using the law to proscribe them. See Bork, Tradition and 
Morality in Constitutional Law, in VIEWS FROM THE BENCH: THE JUDICIARY AND CONSTITU· 
TIONAL POLITICS 166 (M. Cannon & D. O'Brien eds. 1985). His complaint is not with the 
practice of "legislating moral standards," id. at 168; rather it is with the application by judges of 
their own moral views, irrespective oflegislative or original intent. See also Bork, Neutral Princi· 
ples, supra note 10. 
28. E.g., U.S CoNsr. art. IV,§ 2, cl. 1; amend. XIII; amend. XIV,§ 1; amend. XV; amend. 
XVI; amend. XXIV. 
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to answer them, through "the logic of morals." Every moral principle 
that aspires to universal application - "no punishment without justifi-
cation" - would seem to require the presence of another moral prin-
ciple to interpret it (the goal of absolute equality, for instance, to 
provide "justification"). Finally, the interpretation of morality (and 
justice, and the ends of a polity) must come down to a purely personal 
exercise, whether that person be Hadley Arkes, Ronald Dworkin, or 
one of the Founders. Natural law cannot break this moral freefall, 
because it is perceived differently by every natural lawyer. Moral 
truths are not like chemical reactions; they cannot be reproduced in a 
test tube. In the end, only intuition separates our ethics from being 
merely applications of prudence, of trial and error. 
The fault of Beyond the Co~titution is not its failure to prescribe a 
universal legal and political ethic free from subjective notions of truth; 
no one yet has done it, of course, no one may be expected to do it, and 
probably it is impossible. The fault, rather, lies in Arkes' failure to 
recognize the impossibility of the task. · Most likely we can agree with 
Arkes that certain truths animate our Constitution, our polity, our 
basic understanding as Americans and free citizens. We may even be 
able to agree on what a number of those truths are. In this sense his 
book is important and helpful; it challenges us, gently, to back away 
from the words of the Constitution and seek out the truths behind 
them, to recognize the existence of greater principles that give life to 
the text. But Beyond the Constitution leaves one questioning the ulti-
mate value of the enterprise. If judges, lawyers, and statesmen cannot 
agree, in our world of diversity, upon the superficial concepts con-
tained in the clauses, one wonders how they are to identify the weight-
ier principles that lie beyond the text. Ultiinately, the language of 
moral realism fails at the task Arkes seems to have set for it; alone, in 
its essential indeterminacy, it cannot lay the foundation for a solid 
constitutional jurisprudence. 29 
These reservations notwithstanding, Beyond the Constitution is 
worth reading. It may be a book of political philosophy more than it 
is a book of constitutional analysis, and as such it may appeal more to 
the philosopher and the political theorist than to the lawyer or the 
constitutional scholar. For his part, Arkes can scarcely hide his desire 
that the book be read, in a most reflective mode, by judges above all 
others; one suspects, though, that we have moved too far along in our 
jurisprudence for Arkes' message to settle in the ears of a welcoming 
audience. If there is one thing that Arkes, the political philosopher, 
fails to appreciate fully about the esoteric world of the lawyer, it is the 
29. See generally G. WALKER, supra note 16 (arguing that any constitutional theory based 
upon extraconstitutional moral norms must take into account the fact of moral indeterminacy, 
and pointing to Augustinian philosophy as the proper mode for application of morality to consti-
tutional discourse). 
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lawyer's obsessive and ritual concern for precedent. To ask that our 
judges disregard two centuries of doctrinal buttressing of the clauses 
as so much extraneous clutter is to ask too much. 
- Christopher J. Peters 
